CRIMINAL SANCTIONS FOR GROUP LIBEL:
FEASIBILITY AND CONSTITUTIONALITY
JAMES A. SCOTT*
[". .. callousness to the rights of individuals and
minorities leads to barbarism and the destruction
of the essential values of civilized life."' ]
When Joseph Beauharnais, president of the "White Circle
League of America," recently published and had publicly
exhibited in Chicago matter portraying Negroes as depraved, criminal, unchaste, and lacking in virtue, he was perhaps unaware of the existence of an Illinois group libel
statute 2 under which he might be-and was-convicted.
Probably more to his dismay, however, was the overruling by the Illinois Supreme Court of his claim of immunity under the free speech and press shields of the United
States and Illinois Constitutions.3
The Illinois Court rejected as having no conclusive bearing upon the question of the constitutionality of the Illinois
statute the cases of Thornhill v. Alabama,4 Terminiello v.
City of Chicago,5 and Near v. Minnesota.6 In an opinion by
Fulton, J., the Court proceeded:

"The Supreme Court of the United States and
this Court have held that the freedom of speech and
of the press, which is secured by the Constitution,
does not confer an absolute right to speak or publish, without responsibility, whatever one may
choose, or an unrestricted and unbridled license
that gives immunity for every possible use of language and prevents the
punishment of those who
'7
abuse this language."
3rd Year Law Student Duke University; A.B. Duke University 1947.
People v. Barber, 289 N.Y. 378, 386, 46 N.E. 2d 329, 382 (1943).
2 ILL.REv. STAT., Chap. 38, Par. 471 (1949). Quoted infra p. 230. This
statute has been unchanged in form since original passage in 1917.
*

'

People v. Beauharnals,

-

i1.

-,

97 N.E. 2d 343 (1951).

310 U.S. 105 (1940).
337 U.S. 1 (1949).
' 283 U.S. 697 (1931).
7 People v. Beauharnals, supra note 3, citing Gitlow v. New York,
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After repeating the "clear and present danger" test, 8 the
Court stated that a mere reading of the publication in question showed it libelous in that it contained " 'fighting words'
liable to cause violence and disorder between the races. Any
ordinary person could only conclude from the libelous character of the language that a clash and riots would eventually result."9 No merit was found in the accused's claim
that the statute is too broad in scope or that the words of
the statute are too vague.10 The accused attempted to prove
the truth of the alleged libel by showing that offenses in
Negro districts of Chicago were greater in number than in
White, that his brother was shot by a Negro, and that Negro
inhabitation was injurious to real estate values. The Supreme Court rejected such a defense on the grounds that it
was "directed only to a portion of the offense charged and
[the matter] could not in any manner be classed as published for good motives and justifiable ends.""
The Court rather summarily disposed of the constitutional
aspects of defendant's contentions, relying on Bevins v. Prindable,1 2 which it cited as having upheld this same statute.
It is noteworthy that the Bevins case merely held that an
injunction should not issue against the operation of the
statute, and the District Court expressly stated that "we
do not find it now necessary to consider the constitutionality
of the statute."'1 3 It then concluded that the final burden
of passing upon such question shifted to the state court:
"Whether a statute of the State of Illinois is valid
which makes defamation of a class a criminal offense would seem 4first to be a question for the
courts of Illinois."'
268 U.S. 652 (1925) and Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568
(1942).
8 First advanced by Holmes, J., in Schenck v. United States, 249
U. S. 47 (1919).
0 To the effect that the danger must be immeciate, see Herndon v.
Lowry, 301 U.S. 242 (1937); see note 74, inlra.
10 See note 81 infra.
2 People v. Beauharnais, supra note 3, at 346.
12 39 F. Supp. 708 (E.D. Ill. 1941), affirmed by memorandum opinion
In 314 U.S. 573 (1941).
11 Bevins v. Prindable, supra note 12, at 712.
2, Ibid.
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L General Background of Criminal Group Libelwith Civil Analogies
Before a detailed consideration of the criminal group
libel statute as such is undertaken, a brief glance should

be taken at some already formulated concepts of criminal
group libel, and at civil group libel analogies.
The gravamen of the offense of criminal libel is generally
regarded to be the tendency of the libelous words to provoke breaches of the peace. 15 The fundamental theory behind the civil action for libel, on the other hand, seems to
be the protection of the defamed individual's property interest in his reputation, 0 and a reference of the libelous
words to an ascertained or ascertainable person is a prerequisite to bringing the action. 7 Hence the distinction:
a criminal action is theoretically feasible against one defaming a group,'8 whereas, in the case of the civil action,
an individual group member is confronted with the task of
'1 NEWELL, SLANDER AND LI ER, § 807 (4th Ed. 1924); Note, 19 A.L.R.
See CHAEE, FREEDOM OF SPEECH W THE UNITED STATES,
p. 15 (1941).
-6 PRossEn, TORTS, 777 (1941); Pound, Interests of Personality, 28
H.ARv. L. REv. 343 (1915). For an excellent discussion of group libel
statutes generally, see Note, StatutoryProhibitionof Group Defamation,
47 COL. L. REv. 595 (1947). For a most illuminating study of group
libel, see Reisman, Democracy and Defamation: Control of Group Libel,
42 COL. L. REv. 727 (1942). It would seem indeed infrequent that a
libelee would pass up an opportunity to get money damages in a civil
action, but the same incentive does not obtain in the criminal prosecution.
17 See Wilner, The Civil Liability Aspect of Defamation Directed
Against a Collectivity, 90 U. OF PA. L. REV. 414 (1942).
18 See People v. Eastman, 188 N.Y. 478, 81 N.E. 459 (1907), wherein,
after reversing a conviction under an obscenity statute for making a
scurrilous attack upon a large group of Catholic clergymen, the Court
pointed out that a criminal prosecution could be maintained upon the
theory of inciting a breach of the peace, and that "therefore, a criminal prosecution can be sustained where no civil action will lie, as for
instance, in this very case, where the libel is against a class." But an
indictment for libeling all persons of the Jewish faith was dismissed
in People v. Edmundson, 168 N.Y. Misc. 142, 4 N.Y. Supp. 2d 257 (1938);
accord, Regina v. Gathercole [1838] 2 Lewin 237, 168 Eng. Rep. 1140,
wherein it was stated that a "person may, without being liable to
prosecution for it, attack Judaism, . . . or even any sect of the Christian religion," but that prosecution would lie for libel against an
identified group.

1470, at 1473.
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identifying himself as the one toward whom the defamatory
words are directed. This departure in theory, however,
does not render worthless a resort to civil analogies, especially in determining the identity of group, the size thereof,
and, in some cases, the libelous nature of the words used,
all of which are factors often determinative of the probability of a breach of the peace.
A staunch reluctance on the part of the courts to entertain civil suits for group libel, 19 and a widespread disinclination on the part of state officials to prosecute criminal libel
actions based upon a probable breach of the peace,20 can
perhaps best explain not only the existence of the instant
statute upon the Illinois books, but also pleas for legislation
by those minority groups most vulnerable to libelous attack
for reasons of race, religion, or political inclinations.
An American tradition of individualism and "an oversensitivity to the commercial aspects of reputation" have
been suggested as philosophical bases for the judicial reluctance to entertain civil group libel suits. 21 However, the
practical impediments are broad concepts of free speech
23
and of the press, 22 narrow fears of multiplicity of suits,
and belief that existing criminal sanctions are sufficient
24
without civil intervention.
Illustrative of perhaps the maximum extent to which
courts will go in civil group libel actions is the Canadian
case of Ortenbergv. Plamodon,25 where the Court permitted
recovery by a member of the defamed class, all of the Jews
in the city of Quebec, who numbered only seventy-five, a
1G Statutory Prohibition of Group Defamation, supra note 16, 598
et seq.; Reisman, op. cit. supra note 16, 730 et seq.
0 Statutory Prohibition of Group Defamation, supra note 16, 600
et seq.
2 See notes 16 and 19 supra.
mRyckman v. Delavan, 25 Wend. (N.Y.) 186, 199 (1840); People v.
Edmundson, supra note 18, 154; PuossER, TORTS, Sec. 94 (1941). See
also note 19 supra.
2 See Sumner v. Buel, 12 Johns (N.Y.) 475, 478 (1815). See note 17
supra. See also Note, 21 TEx. L. REv. 819 (1943).
2 Statutory Prohibition of Group Defamation, supra note 16, 599;
see note 23 supra.
35 CAN. L. TImEs 262, AxN. CAs. 1915C 347 (1914).
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number small and ascertainable enough to impute direct
designation of the individual member. A more recent Kentucky decision 26 has repudiated the above case. Finding
that the Canadian holding is not binding in the United States
because based upon French instead of English precedent,
the Court held that a defamed member of a family clan
had no cause of action because the clan was too large and
the communication too indefinite to impute injury to an
individual member. Although recoveries have been permitted in some instances where the defamed plaintiff was
one of seventeen accused of murder, 27 a family, 28 a twelveman jury, 29 twelve doctors discharged by a hospital, 0 a
board of medical examiners, 1 six brewing and malting
firms,3 2 four physicians in a coroner's office, 8 and the subor-

dinate engineers of a corporation,8 4 court disfavor of civil
actions of libel against a group is illustrated by denial of
recovery to a member of one of the following groups: proprietors of correspondence schools,3 5 "wine joint" owners
in a certain city, 6 French-Canadians,

7

insurance agents, 88

those engaged in a particular business in a city,89 an army
" Louisville Times v. Stivers, 252 Ky. 843, 68 S.W. 2d 411, 97 A.L.R.
277 (1934).
27 Foxcroft v. Lacy, 80 Eng. Rep. 239 (1613), where libelees were
accused of murder subsequent to acquittal in a conspiracy trial.
Fenstermaker v. Tribune Pub. Co., 13 Utah 532, 45 Pac. 1097 (1896).
29 Byers v. Martin, 2 Colo. 605, 25 Am. Rep. 755 (1875), where the
jury's verdict was called "infamous"; Smallwood v. York, 163 Ky. 139,
173 S.W. 380 (1915). See also Welch v. Tribune Pub. Co., 83 Mich. 661,
47 N.W.562 (1890).
31 Bornmann v. Star Co., 174 N.Y. 212, 66 N.E. 723 (1903), where the
doctors were called jackasses in the guise of doctors.
Fullerton v. Thompson, 123 Minn. 136, 143 N.W. 260 (1913).
"2 Ryckman v. Delavan, supra note 22, where the firms were represented as engaging in filthy production practices.
' Weston v. Commercial Advertiser Ass'n, 184 N.Y. 479, 77 N.E. 660
(1906), where physicians were accused of graft and extortion of money.
3, Hardy v. Williamson, 36 Ga. 551, 12 S.E. 874 (1891), where only
"some of them" were referred to.
13 International Text-book Co. v. Leader Printing Co., 189 Fed. 86
(C.C. Ohio 1910).
"I Comes v. Cruce, 85 Ark. 79, 107 S.W. 185 (1908).
7 Germain v. Ryan, 53 Rap. Jud. 543 (C.S. Quebec 1918).
McGee v. Collins, 156 La. 291, 100 So. 430, 34 A.L.R. 336 (1924).
Watson v. Detroit Journal Co., 143 Mich. 430, 107 N.W. 81 (1906).
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accused of cowardice, 40 a family clan engaged in fist fights
and gun battles, 41 "officers" of a workers' alliance,42 a group
of twenty-three lawyers called "scum and shysters", 43 and
4
more recently, drivers of a taxicab company. "
Notwithstanding the lack of necessity for showing dam-

age45 or identity of the individual in the group, there have

been few criminal prosecutions in the United States for

group libel. 46

Aside from constitutional curbs, 47 policy

considerations play a prominent role in discouraging prose-

cutions. Whenever the defamed party has an adequate civil
remedy, seldom are criminal proceedings instituted.48 The
principal reason attributed to such inaction is the practical

difficulty of obtaining convictions through unanimous verdicts by juries predominantly partial toward the criminal
defendant, especially in the case of minor offenses. 49 Proof
beyond a reasonable doubt is almost too much to be hoped

for in the instance of an "offense which defies exact definite, Palmer v. City of Concord, 48 N.H. 211, 97 Am. Dec. 605 (1868).
Louisville Times v. Stivers, supra note 26.
Noral v. Hearst Publications, Inc., 40 Cal. App. 2d 348, 104 Pac.
2d 860 (1940), where the plaintiff was one of only three paid officials,
but the court held that the term "officers" was not confined to those
receiving compensation.
'"Latimer v. Chicago Daily News, Inc., 330 Ill. App. 295, 71 N.E. 2d
553 (1947), where the court stated that it must be said with certainty
that every individual member in the class must be included in the communication, and that no innuendo can render certain identity of persons
libeled. But cf. note 34 supra. See also Gross v. Cantor, 270 N.Y. 93,
200 N.E. 592 (1936), where all radio editors were referred to, save one.
" Fowler v. Curtis Publishing Co., 182 Fed. 2d 377 (D.C. Cir. 1950).
See Note thereon in 24 So. CAL. L. REv. 213 (1951).
'1 Tracy v. Commonwealth, 87 Ky. 584, 586, 9 S.W. 822, 824 (1888).
See Wilner, op. cit. supra note 17, 437, and Statutory Prohibition of
Group Defamation, supra note 16, 600.
"0 People v. Turner, 28 Cal. App. 766, 154 Pac. 34 (1915); Crane v.
State, 14 Okla. Crim. Rep. 30, 166 Pac. 1110 (1917). See note 18 supra.
Regarding the rarity of such prosecutions, see Reisman, op. cit. supra
note 16, 747 et seq.
," See discussion infra p. 225 et seq.
,eReisman, op. cit. supra note 16, at 748. Query whether there be
any basis for such an excuse, especially if the civil courts simultaneously consider criminal sanctions adequate. See note 24 supra.
,0Reisman, op. cit. supra note 16, at 748.
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ness."50

Then, too, the conviction of a person crying "Free

speech!" conceivably would label him a martyr in the eyes
of many; while acquittal might be publicly misunderstood
as judicial endorsement of his defamatory appellations."
Hence, criminal libel statutes protecting individuals have
been termed "so clumsy as a weapon and so inefficient as a

deterrent" that their abolition has been recommended.5 2
For similar reasons, legislative attempts to afford minority groups protection from libelous onslaughts by the imposition of criminal penalties for group libel have generally

failed.5 3 It would seem to follow that if such protection is
to be afforded, it must be either through the legislative

imposition of more stringent criminal sanctions overriding
current judicial apathy toward such actions, or through an

extension of the scope of the civil action to include individual
members of larger groups.
Ibid. Quoted portion from Bevins v. Prindable, supra note 12 at
I'

712.

1 Reisman, op. cit. supra note 16, at 755. See note 20 supra.
EARNST & LiNDLEY, HoLD Youa TONGUE!, 329 (1932); Wilner, op.
cit supra note 17, at 438; Reisman, op. cit. supra note 16, at 750, 754.
m The instant Illinois statute, supra note 2, so far as cases found
reveal, has been successfully invoked to obtain a conviction only in the
instant case of People v. Beauharnais, supra note 3. Bevins v. Prindable, supra note 12, involved the question of whether or not the operation of the statute should be enjoined; People v. Speilman, 318 Ill. 482,
149 N.E. 466 (1925) upheld a conviction for group libel against members of the American Legion, but under the ordinary libel statute,
currently found in ILL. RPv. STAT., Chap. 38, Par. 402 (1949). See also
People v. Simcox, 379 ill. 347, 40 NE.2d 525 (1942), where complaint
dismissed.
See MAss. ANN. LAws, tit. 9, Chap. 272, Sec. 98c (Michie Supp. 1946),
commented on in 28 MAss. L. Q., no. 4, 104 (1943), which comment
quoted from Boston Herald, May 28, 1943: "The Act will not quiet the
tongues of the venomous and it is so drawn that probably few actions
will be brought, but there it is on the books, it can be invoked." No
case has been found which does invoke this statute.
A New Jersey group libel statute, N.J. REV. STAT., tit. 2, Sec. 157B
(1937), was held unconstitutional in State v. Klapprott, 127 N.J.L. 395,
22 At 2d 877 (1941) as violative of free speech guaranty and as being
void for vagueness. The statute made no distinction between private
and public speech; see discussion in!ra, p. 229 et seq.
For a suggested civil and criminal group defamation statute, see
Statutory Prohibitionof Group Defamation, supra note 16, 608 et seq.
'
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IL Constitutional Limitations Upon State Control
of Group Libel
In view of the United States Supreme Court's adherence
to the doctrine that the Fourteenth Amendment prohibitions do not apply to actions of individuals,5 4 and in view of
Congress's inactivity in the field of group libel, 55 offended
minorities must depend upon the states for aid. Since the
decision of Gitlow v. New York5 6 in 1925, the guaranties of
the First Amendment have been regarded as a part of the
Fourteenth, and, hence, as a limitation upon state activity.
The Illinois statute, 57 or any statute under which criminal
sanction is given for group libel, must therefore accord
with the United States Supreme Court's concepts of the
guaranties of the First Amendment.
As suggested by the Illinois Supreme Court in the principal case of People v. Beauharnais,55 which cites with approval Gitlow v. New York59 and Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire,6 0 rights of speech and of the press are not absolute,
and for abuse of these rights punishment may lie. Protected speech has been said to embrace "at least the liberty
to discuss publicly and truthfully all matters of public concern without previous restraint or fear of subsequent punishment," 61 but speech becomes a subject of at least limited
state interference when it is associated with violence, 62 when
it becomes an instrument of coercion rather than persua" Civil Rights Case, 109 U.S. 3 (1883); United States v. Cruikshank,
92 U.S. 542 (1875).
5 See discussion in Statutory Prohibition o1 Group Defamation,
supra note 16, at 602.
268 U.S. 652 (1925).
" See note 2 supra.
0 See note 3 supra.
19See note 56 supra.
315 U.S. 568 (1942).
0 Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 101 (1940), which held that no
state may impose a blanket restriction upon picketing. Regarding
previous restraint see Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931); Cantwell
v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940); Schneider v. New Jersey, 308 U.S.
147 (1939).
12 Milk Wagon Drivers Union v. Meadowmoor Dairies, 312 U.S. 287
(1941).
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sion,63 when of such commercial nature that regulation is
essential, 64 when lewd, obscene, profane, or "fighting" words
are used, 65 or when words are used in "such circumstances
and are of such a nature as to create a clear and present
danger that they will bring about the substantive evils"
that the state has a right to prevent. 66
There is no convenient, precisely defined line of demarcation between legitimate speech, such as is in the public
interest, on the one hand, and speech which, by either its
misuse or the context in which it is used, becomes a proper
object for state policing. The United States Supreme Court
has purposely avoided the imposition of rigid and unyielding prescriptions for state resolution of the internal conflict
between freedom and order;67 rather, the Court seems to
prefer that this conflict be dealt with by the state courts'
own sincere interpretation of Supreme Court "guides."08
The imaginary line might be said to fall somewhere between an honest attempt on the part of the speaker or
writer to change men's minds and a deliberate use of abusive
language to stir up trouble. 69 This distinction was made in
the case of Cantwell v. Connecticut," wherein a conviction
for a breach of the peace was reversed because the playing
by Jehovah's Witnesses of phonograph records attacking
the Catholic Church was not regarded as a substantive evil
which the State could prevent, since there was not a "clear
and present danger" that violence would result, and since
this is merely a sincere, persuasive method of "proselyting."
The Supreme Court has indicated that the "clear and
present danger" must be immediate 71 and certiorari was
6 NLRB v. Virginia Elec. & Power Co., 314 U.S. 469 (1941).
" Valentine v. Christensen, 316 U.S. 52 (1942).
1 Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, supra note 60, 571; Cantwell v.
Connecticut, supra note 61, 482.
"Schenek v. United States, supra note 8.
0 Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 529 (1945); Nlemotko v. Maryland, 340 U.S. 268 (1951).
'
See note 83 infra, and quoted "guides" infra pp. 228, 229.
See Note, 24 IND. L. J. 78, 86 (1949).
See note 61 supra.
Herndon v. Lowry, supra note 9.

CRIMINAL SANCTIONS FOR GROUP LIBEL

recently denied in the case of Sellers v. Johnson,7 2 wherein
a sheriff was enjoined from preventing a lawful meeting of
Jehovah's Witnesses on the mere pretext that a riot would
inevitably result. But a state disorderly conduct conviction
of a street speaker, who made attacks upon various officials
and sought to arouse Negroes to armed enforcement of their
rights, was upheld in Feiner v. New York. 73 Here, however,
the arrest was made after the speaker had been asked by
policemen to stop, and after it became apparent to the policemen that violence and a breach of the peace would result.
Vinson, C. J., delivering the opinion of the Court stated the
distinction:
"It is one thing to say that the police cannot be
used as an instrument for the suppression of unpopular views, and another to say that, when as
here the speaker passes the bounds of argument or
persuasion and undertakes incitement to riot, they
are powerless to prevent a breach of the peace."7 4
In the case of Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire7 5 a conviction of a street speaker who used "fighting words" in violation of a state statute was upheld. It is noteworthy here
that the State courts had previously held the statute applicable to words used in a public place directly tending to provoke a breach of the peace. A breach of the peace, however,
may not be defined in such broad terms as speech which
merely "stirs the public to anger, invites disputes, brings
163 Fed. 2d 877 (8th Cir. 1947), cert. denied, 322 U.S. 851 (1948).
,3 340 U.S. 315 (1951).

7, Feiner v. New York, supra note 73. Mr. Justice Black, dissenting,
considers the decision "a long step toward totalitarian authority";
that it amounts to approval of "a simple and readily available technique
by which cities and states can with impunity subject all speeches, political or otherwise, on streets or elsewhere, to the supervision and
censorship of the local police."
75 See note 60 supra.
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about a condition of unrest, or creates a disturbance," especially in the case of a private hall 7 6
In a special opinion concurring with the majority, Justice
Frankfurter combines for consideration the recent cases
of Niemotko v. Maryland7 7 Kunz v. New York, 7s and Feiner

v. New York7 where he attempts in summary fashion to
give some guides for reconciling the conflict between speech
and other interests, such as public order. He poses pertinent questions on which decisions turn and briefly gives
answers:
"(1) What is the interest deemed to require the
regulation of speech? The State cannot of course forbid public proselyting or religious argument merely
because public officials disapprove the speaker's views.
It must act in patent good faith to maintain the public
peace, to assure the availability of the streets for their
primary purposes of passenger and vehicular traffic,
or for equally indispensable ends of modern community life.
"(2) What is the method used to achieve such ends
as a consequence of which public speech is constrained
or barred? A licensing standard which gives an official authority to censor the content of a speech differs
toto coelo from one limited by its terms, or by nondiscriminatory practice, to considerations of public safety
and the like. Again, a sanction applied after the event
assures consideration of the particular circumstances
of a situation. The net of control must not be cast too
broadly.
"(3) What mode of speech is regulated? A sound
truck may be found to affect the public peace as normal
speech does not. A man who is calling names or using
the kind of language which would reasonably stir an70Terminiello v. City of Chicago, supra note 5, wherein the Supreme
Court reversed a conviction under a city disorderly conduct ordinance.
While addressing an anti-Semitic meeting in a private hall, defendant
referred to a mob, which was picketing the hall and which had made
some assaults upon attenders of the meeting, as "slimy scum." The conviction was upset largely upon the broad grounds upon which the trial
court defined a breach of the peace.
7 See note 67 supra.
340 U.S. 290 (1951).
72 See note 73 supra.
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other to violence does not have the same claim to protection as one whose speech is an appeal to reason.
"(4) Where does the speaking which is regulated
take place? Not only the general classificationsstreets, parks, private buildings-are relevant. The
location and size of a park; its customary use for the
recreational, esthetic and contemplative needs of a community; the facilities, other than a park or street corner, readily available in a community for airing views,
are all pertinent considerations in assessing the limitations the Fourteenth Amendment puts on State power
in a particular situation."8' 0
Any state statute which limits the exercise of speech, and
imposes criminal penalties upon abuses thereof, must not
be so vague in its terms or so indefinite in setting forth the
type of conduct made subject to penalty as to violate well
settled notions of due process of law. If the statute is so
broad and vague as to permit within the scope of its language
the punishment of incidents fairly within the protection of
free speech, it is void-especially if men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning, and differ as
to its application.81 In State v. Klapprott82 the New Jersey
Supreme Court held a New Jersey group libel statute unconstitutional from the standpoint of vagueness. Such terms
as "hatred," "abuse," and "hostility" were regarded as abstract terms, and the court concluded:
"The criminal code must be definite and informative
so that there may be no doubt in the mind of the '8citizen3
ry that the interdicted act or conduct is illicit.
In considering challenges to the constitutionality of state
statutes, the United States Supreme Court encourages, and

10Niemotko

v. Maryland, supra note 67, at 282, 283.
8 Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507, 509 (1948); Cantwell v. Connecticut, supra note 61, at 308; Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451,
453 (1939); Carlson v. California, 310 U.S. 106, 112 (1940); Herndon v.
Lowry, supra note 9, at 258. But cf. Communications Ass'n v. Douds,
339 U.S. 382, 413 (1950). "A mind intent upon willful evasion is inconsistent with surprised innocence." United States v. Ragen, 314
U.S. 513, 524 (1942).
8 See note 53 supra.
8 State v. Klapprott, supra note 53.
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gives considerable weight to, firm declarations of state policy, and the Court occasionally will allow the state courts
to rectify an otherwise too vague statute by a narrow interpretation thereof.8 4 Generally speaking, however, statutes
limiting free speech are strictly construed upon the face of
the statute.
HI. Possible Defects in the Illinois Criminal
Group Libel Statute
The Illinois statute which imposes criminal penalties for
libeling a group reads as follows:
"It shall be unlawful for any person, firm or corporation to manufacture, sell, or offer for sale, advertise
or publish, present or exhibit in any public place in
this state any lithograph, moving picture, play, drama
or sketch, which publication or exhibition portrays depravity, criminality, unchastity, or lack of virtue of a
class of citizens, of any race, color, creed or religion,
which said publication or exhibition exposes the citizens of any race, color, creed or religion to contempt,
derision, or obloquy or which is productive of breach
of the peace or riots. Any person, firm, or corporation
violating any of the provisions of this section, shall be
guilty of a misdemeanor, and upon conviction thereof,
shall be punished by a fine of not less than fifty . . .
nor more than two hundred dollars . . ."81,
Whether or not there may be inherent in this statute
defects upon which its constitutionality might properly be
challenged can best be revealed by a brief analysis of its
provisions. The questions which Mr. Justice Frankfurter
suggested as general guides may be helpful in this analysis.8 6
The interest deemed to require the regulation of speech is
that of protecting minority groups from abusive libels,
which, it is submitted, is an interest calling for state aid
through criminal sanctions. The frequent use of the disjunctive, however, lends uncertainty as to the scope of the
" Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, supra note 60, at 574; Fox v. Washington, 236 U.S. 273, 276 (1915); but cf. Herndon v. Lowry, supra note 9.
" See note 2 supra.
" See pp. 228, 229 supra, and note 80 supra.
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interest sought to be protected. Is non-exposure of a class
of "citizens of any race, color, creed or religion to contempt"
so much in the public interest that one may not with impunity write that "all Jews are contemptible," or even that
some of them are? Must the public peace be actually threatened? How far may one go in religious proselyting?
The statute imposes a sanction after the event, hence
avoiding prior censorship or restraint of the nature condemned by the Court. But is the "net of control" not cast
so broadly as to include therein language fairly within the
protection of free speech and of free press? Would not
men of ordinary intelligence conjecture as to the meaning
of the terms of the statute, or differ as to its application?
Insofar as the subject matter of the speech sought to be
regulated is confined to that which would reasonably stir
others to violence, the statute is perhaps within constitutional limits. But there would appear great room for interpretation of the terms of the statute to include, and infringe
upon, the legitimate exercise of speech, such as may be
considered in the public interest, or that which in fact would
never be calculated to incite libelees to rioting and violence.
It is easily conceivable that many publications purportedly
within the contemplation of the terms of the statute could
be publicly displayed and yet would not be of such a nature
as to create a clear and present danger of the evils which
the state has a right to prevent. A great saving feature of
the statute, however, is that it provides that the publication
must be exhibited in a public place.
The uncertainties above suggested may or may not be
such defects as would, under a current United States Supreme Court test of validity, render the statute unconstitutional, but it is submitted that the threat of such an invalidating decision could be appreciably reduced by a few minor
changes in the statute: deletion of all of the first sentence
appearing after the words "class of citizens, of any race,
color, creed or religion, which said publication or exhibition," and, after the above quoted words, substitution of
the following: "because of the defamatory nature thereof,
either actually provokes and produces a breach of the peace,
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or provokes and produces such a clear and imminent threat
of a breach of the peace as it would be the duty of a police
officer to prevent."
Although the above suggested alteration would perhaps
safely ward off challenges to constitutionality, it would
somewhat reduce the apparent scope of the instant statute.
But it can at least be said that such an alteration would
lessen the need for would-be defamers to speculate as to
the meaning of the terms, or as to the nature of the offense.
Inasmuch as it is the prevention, without prior restraint,
of libelous onslaughts against minority groups that is the
statutory end desired to be achieved, and surely a big factor
in the maintenance of public peace, it would seem that an
appreciable enhancement in the penalty provisions of the
statute would serve to discourage the dissemination of at
least the truly notorious libels, those most certain to provoke breaches of the peace. The greater weight of the penalty should induce a greater weighing of words. The enhancement in penalty might take the form of a revocation, or at
least a temporary suspension, of the corporate charter of the
printing, publishing, or exhibiting corporation-an afterthe-event sanction, although it might be considered a prior
restraint on future publication. 7 The suspension might
validly be imposed pending the payment of a heavy fine, or
.be invoked after a second conviction under the statute. Were
suspension or revocation of corporate charters at stake, or a
penalty of comparable propensity, printers would more
scrupulously seek to avoid public portrayal of minority
groups as depraved, criminal, unchaste, or lacking in virtue,
and battles of propaganda would doubtless be fought upon a
more elevated plane of moral decency and respectability.
IV. Conclusion
That the protection of classes of persons from libelous
onslaughts which provoke peace disturbances is a socially
desirable field for state policing is by no means to be ques67See People v. White Circle League of America, - Ill. -, 97 N.E. 2d
811 (1951), wherein revocation of corporate charter was upheld.
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tioned. Whether of a civil or of a criminal nature, legislation directed toward affording adequate protection to minority groups has been on the whole none too successful. While
there are practical and administrative obstacles standing
in the way of success, perhaps the greatest barrier is the
United States Constitution, which, as interpreted by the
Courts, most jealously guards individual guaranties, sometimes at the expense of group interests. All too frequently,
perhaps, the particular individual whose speaking rights
are so religiously protected is a mere judgment-proof propaganda medium through whom large subversive organizations
under protective shields publish and disseminate highly injurious, libelous matter to the unwarranted detriment of
defenseless minority groups-defenseless, save to the small
extent that state legislatures and courts have in fact recognized the problem and given it some criminal sanction.
It has become well settled that the guaranties of the First
and Fourteenth Amendments are not absolute, and where
abuse of these guaranties becomes of such nature that the
public peace is either threatened or disturbed, it becomes a
proper subject of state regulation. But any statute in
derogation of these guaranties must accord with the formulated concepts regarding exceptions to the right to speak
or write with impunity, and must not be couched in such
vague terms that the nature and limit of the offense is
necessarily a subject of speculation.

